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Abstract
Participants in payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes can be identified in
numerous ways, for example, through social or spatial targeting. However, little is
known about how the type of participant targeting will influence the PES out-
comes. Using a longstanding PES scheme in Cidanau Indonesia, we evaluate the
outcomes of using social and spatial participant identification. The outcomes com-
pared are participant perceptions of equity, understanding, and compliance. This
scheme contracts farmers at the group level and has had two implementation
phases, the first contracted farmers based on social relationships and the second
based on spatial proximity of their plots to reduce monitoring costs. We find that
both the social and spatial targeting of participants is perceived as fair, and all par-
ticipants are complying. Our results thus suggest that the perceived trade-off
between efficiency and equity is not ubiquitous and that efficiency gains were
made without compromising compliance and perceived equity. We also find that
training for the farmer group (FG) leaders is crucial in ensuring that the rest of the
FG members understand the PES scheme and its requirements.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are a widely
implemented instrument for environmental conservation.
How participants are identified and at what level they are
contracted is one of the first crucial steps in a scheme's
implementation process. Due to the variability in PES imple-
mentation, there are common concerns about participation in
PES regarding additionality (Kerr, Vardhan, & Jindal,
2014), whether participation is voluntary (Börner et al.,
2017), and the motivations to participate (Fisher, 2012).
Within this paper, we explore two types of participant identi-
fication, comparing social and spatial targeting, across a
group-level contract in a PES scheme in Indonesia.
Organizers can identify how people participate in many
ways, for example targeting by spatial factors or targeting by
social connections. Spatial targeting, the process of identify-
ing PES participants based on some spatial factor
(e.g., proximity to other participants, areas of high carbon
stock) can allow for multiple benefits to be achieved in an
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efficient manner, for instance through reducing transport
costs involved in monitoring (de Koning et al., 2011).
Wünscher, Engel, and Wunder (2008) found that using spa-
tial targeting increased the efficiency of a PES scheme in
Costa Rica but they further argued that this targeting failed
to consider the non-monetary values of landowners
(e.g., conservation preferences). This, in turn, could influ-
ence participation. Furthermore, identifying areas that are
more under threat, with higher service provision and lower
costs can improve PES results, specifically with regard to
carbon storage (Angelsen et al., 2009). Selecting participants
based on their social relations, for example contracting
farmers in pre-existing groups has potential implications. In
some cases, it may be more efficient whereby high levels of
trust can help increase participation (Zanella, Schleyer, &
Speelman, 2014). However, despite the apparent gains for
each participant selection type, currently, little research has
been completed comparing the outcomes of using either a
social or spatially targeted selection processes.
Participants can be contracted at the individual, group or
community level. Communities that have shared resources
may prefer a community-level contract. For example, it was
found that forest-based communities are more likely to have
shared resources and subsequently have benefits distributed
at the community level (Mahanty, Suich, & Tacconi, 2013).
However, being contracted at the community level may not
reflect all the preferences at the individual level, whereby
some community members may not be active members in
the decision-making process (Murtinho & Hayes, 2017). It is
also possible that within these collective groups, the prefer-
ences for the PES will only represent the leader rather than
the group's best interest. For example, the preferences of the
poorer or more marginalized individuals may be overlooked
(Murtinho & Hayes, 2017; Sommerville, Milner-Gulland,
Rahajaharison, & Jones, 2010). Furthermore, there is a cur-
rent literature gap in how participants will perceive group-
level targeting both socially and spatially. Achieving a
well-informed fair collective decision can take time as
individuals within the community need to access informa-
tion and build a consensus (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001;
Ostrom, 1990). A key aspect to guarantee equitable partici-
pation in PES may thus lie in preventing power dominance
by single individuals and creating or using existing plat-
forms for consensus building. An already established insti-
tution within a community can aid in the implementation
and subsequent participation of a PES scheme at the com-
munity level (Hayes & Murtinho, 2018; Kosoy, Corbera, &
Brown, 2008). For example, a community with a pre-
existing natural resource management institution may be
more likely to participate in the scheme (Bremer, Farley, &
Lopez-Carr, 2014). The sellers of the ES are a vital com-
ponent of PES as their views and opinions have the ability
to determine if the scheme is successful (Petheram &
Campbell, 2010). If stakeholders do not consider the PES
socially legitimate, it may be unsuccessful in obtaining its
desired environmental objectives.
Building on this, little is known about what type of
targeting will increase participants' compliance in a scheme.
If individuals contracted into a PES do not comply, the
scheme risks not achieving its intended outcomes, both
social and ecological. Many different factors influence an
individual's decision to comply with their respective PES
contract. For example, compliance may be influenced by
benefits—the payments are enough to cover the individual's
opportunity costs—or by social pressure to comply
(e.g., with group level contracts [Narloch, Drucker, &
Pascual, 2017]). Efficiency is defined as achieving the PES
objective at the lowest cost, whereas equity is discussed
through the distribution of costs and benefits, often using the
term “pro-poor” (Martin, Gross-Camp, Kebede, & McGuire,
2014). PES schemes focusing solely on efficiency, such as
those that rely on spatial targeting, can potentially generate
trade-offs with equity that may be detrimental. For example,
placing more emphasis on efficiency over equity increases
the risk of civil unrest as inequalities grow. Perceived unfair-
ness and inequities can lead to inefficient outcomes under-
mining collective behavior and increasing the chances of
negative behavior (Martin, Gross-Camp, Kebede,
McGuire, & Munyarukaza, 2014). This can, in turn, lead to
other issues such as leakage and to threaten the permanence
of the PES scheme at hand (Jost & Gentes, 2014). Giving
equity and efficiency an equal weighting within a scheme
can, therefore, garner positive results (Leimona, van
Noordwijk, de Groot, & Leemans, 2015; Pascual et al.,
2014). Despite the perceived common notion of the trade-off
between equity and efficiency in PES, the actual implica-
tions of spatial versus social targeting of participants on this
trade-offs are poorly studied.
Non-compliance can also be influenced through a multi-
tude of other reasons, some of which may be compounding.
For example, if a scheme is inequitable or if an individual
does not understand the contract they may not comply.
Ensuring that participants understand the contract by giving
information is key for the success of the program at hand.
As such, proponents of the scheme have been said to be the
most important source of information to participants
(Angelsen, Brockhaus, Sunderlin, & Verchot, 2012). How-
ever, within group-level contracts, this task will often fall
with the leader of the group to effectively and accurately dis-
seminate information to the other members. For instance,
strong leadership was found to be the most important aspect
attributed to the success of fisheries management (Gutiérrez,
Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011). In addition, being contracted at the
group level may lead to increased compliance and
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achievement of objectives, due to group cohesiveness and
social influence (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013). Importantly,
collective contracting can allow for more communication
and information sharing between participants (Narloch et al.,
2017), which in turn can increase cohesion and achievement
of the environmental outcomes.
Given current gaps in the literature, in this paper, we aim
to investigate the outcomes of two phases of a PES imple-
mentation (social and spatial targeting) of group contracted
farmers using multiple factors (fairness, compliance, and
understanding/information) focusing on a scheme in the
Cidanau watershed, Indonesia. This PES scheme has had
two distinct implementation phases. Phase A was based on
the NGOs (Rekonvasi Bhumi) relationship with the farmer
groups (FGs) and their track record in a previous conserva-
tion program and phase B was based on the spatial proximity
of the PES plots. The implementation changed to increase
the schemes efficiency via reducing transport costs in plot
monitoring and compliance checking. We have three core
objectives in this paper. First, we compare fairness and
levels of compliance between both implementation phases.
Our hypothesis is that the efficiency gains in Phase B were
obtained at the expense of lower fairness and compliance.
Second, we compare the understanding and information
sources of the scheme between the two phases. Third, we
explore the group-level contract and group cohesiveness
across both phases, hypothesizing that the more efficient
scheme will present less cohesiveness. This case study
allows for a unique insight into how PES outcomes may
change when identifying participants at the group level using
different targeting strategies.
2 | THE CIDANAU PES SCHEME
2.1 | Site information
The Cidanau watershed is approximately 22,036 ha and
located within the Banten province of Western Java
(Figure 1). Approximately 4,488 ha of land has been
selected as critical land areas of conservation priority.
Cidanau contains six sub-districts and 60 villages, with most
of the population working in the agricultural sector. The
FIGURE 1 Map of Cidanau and
location of payments for ecosystem
services villages. A, Kadubeureum; B,
Ramea; C, Kadu Kempong; D,
Cikumbueun; E, Panjangjaya; F,
Cisitu; G, Citaman. Source: ICRAF
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watershed is one of the most important hydrological systems
in West Java as it supplies the water for domestic and indus-
trial consumption in the Banten Province and acts as a reser-
voir for the Cidanau River. One area of particular
importance is the Rawa Danau Nature Reserve, which lies at
the bottom of the bowl-shaped watershed. The population of
this area, particularly in the rural upland areas, are predomi-
nantly agroforestry farmers who depend on their land to sus-
tain their existing livelihoods. Extensive farming and
agricultural encroachment have led to a decrease in forest
cover and watershed services throughout the landscape. Par-
ticularly around the Rawa Danau Nature Reserve.
Community-level programs are common throughout
Indonesia in both rural and urban settings and are headed
by the village chief (Okten & Osili, 2004). Throughout the
Cidanau watershed, many villages have been the target of
agricultural conservation programs. However, these have
been met with limited success due to the limited attention
given to social issues (Leimona, Pasha, & Rahadian,
2010). As farming is the main occupation, most farmers
are organized into FGs. These groups were established to
provide a forum for farmers to communicate and share
experiences across members, increase incomes and in some
cases allow for a stronger bargaining position to vendors.
Historically there has been one established FG per village,
however, over the past few decades, the number of FGs
per village has been increasing. These FGs will have a
leader who is usually chosen by a group consensus. The
groups will often consist of other members appointed as a
secretary or accountant.
Given the multifaceted environmental problems sur-
rounding the Cidanau watershed numerous efforts have been
taken to improve the environmental conditions, however,
these were met with limited success. In 2005, a PES scheme
was implemented with the focus of preserving the forest
cover and rehabilitating the critical land areas. This small-
scale PES scheme is similar to other schemes throughout
Asia and participants are contracted at the group level.
2.2 | Intermediary and funding
Watershed management in Indonesia is a complicated pro-
cess involving numerous interests from different actors,
making the negotiation process of managing a watershed dif-
ficult and time-consuming (Arifin, 2005; Budhi, Sa, & Iqbal,
2016). The FKDC (Forum Komunikasi DAS Cidanau) con-
sists of a local NGO (Rekonvasi Bhumi), government offices
(i.e., forestry and agriculture department, planning office),
and various governors/officers (i.e., governor of Banten
Province, secretary general of Banten). The FKDC provides
management and guidance of the PES in the Cidanau water-
shed (Figure 2). The funder's of the PES scheme are a water
company (KTI) and a chemical company (Asahimas)
downstream.
2.3 | Selection of the PES area and
participants
The PES scheme has had two distinct implementation phases
(Table 1). Intermediaries in phase A (2005–2015) targeted
FIGURE 2 Illustrative diagram
of the Cidanau payments for
ecosystem services program and flow
of money. Source: Adapted from
Leimona, Pasha, and Rahadian (2010)
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PES locations based on three land requirements factors and
the selection of FGs was based on the subjectivity of the
intermediaries (Lapeyre, Pirard, & Leimona, 2015). The
contracted FGs faced no other requirements to their inclu-
sion and were based on the NGOs relationship with the FGs
and their track record in a previous conservation program.
The previous programs to improve the watersheds quality
included a transmigration program, reforestation and land
rehabilitation activities (Leimona, Pasha, & Rahadian,
2010). Phase B (2015–2019), with the help of ICRAF,
selected groups based on a developed map of key areas
(Amaruzaman, Rahadian, & Leimona, 2017). Based on these
five factors 3,360 ha of land and 30 candidate villages were
identified.
A core difference between phase A and B is that in phase
B the farmers must have their land be contiguous with the
other group members. This group land requirement led to
FGs within phase B being created and/or amended in,
whereas in phase A the farmers were contracted in their pre-
established group. These pre-existing FGs are voluntary
groups and throughout all the communities, they fit the defi-
nition of collective action with a set of institutional rules and
norms in place. By contracting farmers in groups during
phase B, the organizers also maintained existing collective
action features by preserving community institutions, cul-
ture, and traditions. To explain in more detail, by contracting
the farmers at the group level, they are making the PES more
familiar to the participants as farmers traditionally through-
out this region are organized into groups.
Phase A was deemed inefficient due to high compli-
ance monitoring costs. Due to the farmers' plots being spo-
radically located throughout the landscape making it
difficult to conduct random monitoring. To overcome this,
a core aspect of phase B was the spatial proximity of the
farmers' plots. This requirement made the scheme imple-
mentation and monitoring more efficient by reducing the
costs to the facilitators. Furthermore, having all of the
farmers lands in one area increases the environmental
effectiveness of watershed protection (Banerjee, Cason,
de Vries, & Hanley, 2017).
2.4 | Role of the farmer group
As the farmers are contracted in one group (Data S1), the
group organization and composition is important. All the
PES contracted FGs have a group leader, secretary, and
accountant, in line with the traditional FG structure. The
leaders of the FG have a core role of liaising between the
local NGO and the rest of the FG participants. In some
cases, the FG leader may also be the village leader. Each
group receives payments proportional with the total amount
of hectares enrolled. The FG leaders receive this payment
and decide, upon their discretion, to either withhold some
money from group members (i.e., for community benefit
projects or for group savings) or pay each farmer the total
amount. Most FG leaders will withhold some money.
2.5 | PES verification
In both phases, farmers must maintain at least 500 trees/ha
during the contract. If any trees are cut, the farmers must
replant them. If there is a breach of contract by any one
member of the FG, all members will receive a sanction with
TABLE 1 Description of the payments for ecosystem services
implementation
Social (phase A) Spatial (phase B)
Contract duration 2005–2015 2015–2019
Contract payment
(USD)
(ha/year)
$120 $135
Land
identification
1. Sedimentation
vulnerable area
2. High deforestation
rates
3. Private property
located nearby the
settlement/village
1. Upstream areas of
the Cidanau
watershed
2. Outside of the state
forest,
conservation
forest, settlement
and paddy field
areas
3. Slope needed to be
above 15%
4. 200 m above sea
level
5. Village areas are at
least 50 ha in size
Group land
requirements
25 ha in total 25 ha of land must be
spatially proximate
to each other
(contiguous)
Group
identification
At the discretion of
local NGO
Complete proposal for
local NGO
including:
1. The organization
structure of their
farmer groups
2. Their land
management and
conservation plan
3. The
benefit-sharing
plan
Group
composition
Pre-existing farmer
groups
Farmer groups created
and/or amended to
fulfill the contiguous
land requirement
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the possibility of the contract being terminated. Within the
newer implementation phase B, the PES contract requires
the farmers to also undertake environmental management
activities, resulting in Phase B farmers receiving a slightly
higher payment (Table 1). These activities include reducing
soil erosion through boreholes, livestock development, and
home–industry activities. The compliance monitoring for
phase A is manual, on-the-ground, and consists of verifica-
tion and ground-checking on the farmers contracted land.
Phase B monitoring is also manual and, in collaboration with
ICRAF, the FKDC is developing remote monitoring pro-
cesses using canopy density evaluations.
3 | METHODS
3.1 | Data collection
Two groups were identified for the surveys, participants in
phase A (n = 87), and participants in phase B (n = 100). A
participant list collected from Rekonvasi Bhumi was ran-
domly sampled. The surveys (Data S6) were translated into
Bahasa Indonesian by a native speaker familiar in PES and
validated by two ICRAF researchers. A one-day training
was organized for the enumerators of Rekonvasi Bhumi
(local NGO), with the help of ICRAF, so that they were
familiar with the content of the questionnaire to improve its
accuracy. The surveys were completed in November 2016.
The first day of data collection was removed as it was
treated as a pilot survey. All scale/ranking questions were
administered using meta-plan cards that were shown to each
respondent. The numbers of the scale were demonstrated
through unhappy to very happy smiley faces to ensure the
respondent understood the intended answer.
In May 2017, we conducted follow-up focus group dis-
cussions (FGDs) to verify and interpret the findings from the
previous survey and data analysis. We conducted four
FGDs, two with phase A participants and two with phase
B. Within these FGDs for each phase, one FGD was with
the group leaders and the other FGD was for group mem-
bers, approximately five to nine members were present in
each FGD. This was to avoid the members being condi-
tioned on their answers based on the FG leader. This is
important as village leaders and elders have power domi-
nance in decision making (Leimona, Jack, Lusiana, &
Pasha, 2010).
3.2 | Survey content and data
Information on the individual farmer's demographics was
collected. Including age, number of years of education, eth-
nicity, if their family helps on the plot, number of family
members living in the house, do they have a second job, do
they come from the area, do they have a loan, and what is
their asset level (low, medium, high, breakdown in Data S2).
Plot-level details were collected including area, tenure, what
they produce, and if they have multiple farming plots.
Participants were first asked if they agree with a defini-
tion of fairness. This being—fair treatment or due rewards
for all participants. Then once farmers had answered yes or
no, they were then asked, bearing in mind the above defini-
tion, do they think the Cidanau PES scheme is overall fair
(yes or no). We then gave the participants a definition of
each dimension of equity (distributional, recognitional, pro-
cedural, and contextual) and asked them if they thought the
scheme considered them (yes or no).
Data on the FGs' compliance was collected from the
quarterly monitoring process supplied by the local NGO
(Rekonvasi Bhumi). For this, we used the most recently
collected data for all groups (November to December
2016). For the compliance and verification monitoring, the
local NGO first randomly selects a few members from each
group to check. Using these few members, they extrapolate
their results to represent the entire group. Therefore, the
data used within this analysis is at the group level and we
follow the same assumption as the local NGO, which is
that the select farmers are an adequate representation of the
wider group.
We also collected data on if the farmers understood the
PES, which was broken down into three components: under-
standing the PES purpose, understanding the PES action,
and understanding what happens if they do not comply.
These three components of understanding were categorized
as low, medium or high levels of understanding based on
their responses to a set list of choices (Data S3).
We asked all participants to answer questions regarding
the scheme and their perceptions. These include, if they
received enough information during the PES, if they
received enough information before the PES to make an
informed decision to join and if they feel that they need
more information from the organizers. Within these ques-
tions, we also asked them to identify where they received
the information for before the PES and during its
implementation.
To assess perceptions of the PES contract, we first asked
participants if they would prefer an individual-level contract
rather than a group-level contract (i.e., receiving money
directly rather than going through the FG). In addition, we
asked farmers if they would like more money from the
scheme. This could be interpreted as more money from the
local NGO or more money from the FG, as some FGs set
aside a small percentage of money for community develop-
ment projects.
We measured the group cohesiveness of the FGs through
the group environment questionnaire (GEQ) (Whitton &
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Fletcher, 2014) which was modified to be applicable to the
PES. We hypothesized that the group cohesiveness may be
stronger in the first phase compared with the second. We
also anticipate group cohesiveness to influence the partici-
pants understanding of the scheme and potentially their per-
ceptions. Group cohesion has been found to influence
success in other conservation programs (Gutiérrez
et al., 2011).
The GEQ is an 18 question Likert scale survey (ranked
1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly agree) grouped of four
main factors, 1, group integration—social (GI-S); 2, group
integration—task (GI-T); 3, individual attractions to the
group—social (ATG-S); and 4, individual attractions to the
group—task (ATG-T). Group integration—social (GI-S)
refers to a group member's sense of bonding as a social unit
and closeness. Group integration—task (GI-T) relates to a
group member's feelings towards the group's closeness and
bonding over the group's task. Individual attractions to the
group—social (ATG-S) relates to the group member's
impressions of social connections and acceptance within the
group. Individual attractions to the group—task (ATG-T)
relates to the group member's feelings about their own
involvement in the group's goals and productivity. In the
dataset we sum the total value for each factor, taking into
consideration the reverse scoring for some questions,
treating each factor as continuous within the data analysis.
3.3 | Data analysis
All statistical analyses were completed using the R statistical
environment (R Core Team, 2017), all plots were created
using the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2009).
For our first aim, comparing fairness and compliance, we
explore the descriptive statistics of farmers characteristics,
perceived fairness, and level of compliance. For the second
aim, exploring, the participants understanding and informa-
tion, we first grouped the understanding questions by the
FGs including where they have gotten information. We next
ran an ordinal regression, using the ordinal package
(Christensen, 2015), for each of the understanding variables
(understanding the PES purpose, action, compliance, and the
averaged variables) against the phase of the implementation,
the farmer characteristics and plot data. For the third aim,
perceptions of group level contact and group cohesiveness,
we explore the descriptive data for both phase A and B.
For all models ran we tested interaction terms between
phase and the farmer's characteristics to further capture
potentially different responses between phases A and
B. Using information theory and AIC we found the best
fitting model. All models listed below represent the best
fitting models.
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics of farmer characteristics and
summary statistics of survey results
Variable
Phase A—
Social (n = 87)
Phase B—
Spatial (n = 100)
Characteristics
Average plot size (ha)
Min 0.125 0.06
Max 1.25 1.50
Mean 0.45 0.70
Years of education
Min 1 0
Max 12 14
Mean 5.9 6.55
Age
Min 30 22
Max 80 71
Mean 49.94 45.63
Second job (%)
Yes 26 43
No 74 57
Number of family
members
Min 0 0
Max 8 9
Mean 4.1 4.36
Loan (%)
Yes 1 7
No 99 93
Asset category (%)
Low 23 18
Moderate 64.4 70
High 12.6 12
Fairness (%)
Do you agree with this
definition of fairness?
Yes 99 100
No 1 0
Do you think the
payments for
ecosystem services
scheme is fair?
Yes 98 100
No 2 0
Group cohesiveness
(mean)
Individual attraction to
group
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4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Farmer characteristics, fairness, and
compliance across phase A (social) and phase B
(spatial)
The average of farmer characteristics between each of the
phases have some differences (Table 2). Phase B farmers
have larger plot sizes, more education, are younger, and are
more likely to have a second job. Conversely, phase A
farmers have smaller plot sizes, fewer years of education,
are slightly older, and less likely to have a second job. Over-
all, the number of family members and the likelihood of hav-
ing a loan are similar for both phases. We find that 99% of
phase A and 100% of phase B participants agreed to the defi-
nition of fairness. For if the participants think the scheme is
fair or not we find that 98% of phase A and 100% of
phase B, respectively, said yes. Overall, the participants
think the scheme is considering each dimension of equity
(Figure 3). The lowest proportion of yes responses was
within procedural equity where both phases had 88.5 and
89%, respectively. The largest difference between the Phase
respondents was in distributional equity whereby Phase A
had 90.8%, yes and Phase B has 95%. Neither contextual nor
recognitional equity showed large differences between the
two phases.
The compliance between the two PES phases was also
similar (Table 3). The results indicate that some of the FGs
were going beyond their compulsory actions, meaning that
some farmers are planting over the total number of trees
required on their plot. Some of the FGs were achieving over
a 100% compliance rate due to them planting more trees on
their land and not cutting any down.
4.2 | PES understanding and information
Within the analyses, we find that the understanding was sim-
ilar between the two phases, aside from the understanding
action model where phase B are more likely to understand
(Figure 4, model tables in Data S4). All the understanding
models showed, by contrast, a positive relationship with the
group-integration to the task (GIT) variable. We also found
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variable
Phase A—
Social (n = 87)
Phase B—
Spatial (n = 100)
Social 15 14.7
Task 11.5 11.5
Group integration
Social 11.9 11
Task 17.8 17
Perceptions of the group
contract (%)
Prefer individual level
contract (rather than
group level)?
Yes 7 16
No 93 84
Want more money from
the scheme/farmer
group?
Yes 43 52
No 57 48
0
25
50
75
100
Contextual Equity Distributional Equity Procedural Equity Recognitional Equity
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FIGURE 3 Distribution of respondent perception if the scheme
has considered the dimensions of equity (contextual, distributional,
procedural, and recognitional) across the two implementation phases
TABLE 3 Compliance data at the group level
Phase Farmer group Verification (%)
A Group 1 100
Group 2 190
Group 3 137.4
Group 4 115.4
Group 5 135.44
Group 6 130
B Group 7 126.72
Group 8 —
Group 9 132.88
Group 10 106.96
Group 11 102.25
Group 12 100
Data corresponds to number of planted trees on farmer group plots during
verification monitoring.
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a positive relationship with the farmers' education and their
understanding of the PES schemes purpose.
The information source for the participants, both before
the scheme was implemented and during the schemes imple-
mentation process, was varied (Data S5). For phase A, infor-
mation before the PES implementation is mixed between the
local NGO (Rekonvasi Bhumi), the village chairman, and
the leader of the FGs. With the majority of information dur-
ing the scheme implementation being from the FG leaders.
For phase B we found a slightly different scenario before the
PES was implemented the information was mainly from the
local NGO and during the implementation the information is
from either the village chairman or the FG leader. It is
important to highlight the differences between the village
chairman and FG leader. Within some of the FGs
(i.e., Harapanjaya), the FG leaders are also village leaders.
Due to this, disentangling the information source can be con-
voluted; ultimately, we treat the village chairman and FG
leaders as the same group of individuals.
For the participant's perceptions of the group level con-
tract, we find that the phase B group are more likely to want
individual level contracts (16% said yes) compared to the
phase A group (7% said yes). However, we do see similari-
ties between if the farmers want more money from the
scheme. Building on this, the group cohesiveness measures
shows similarities between the phases for individual
attractions to the group both social and task. Whereas, in
phase A we find that they have a higher ranking for group
integration social and task. This indicates that phase A par-
ticipants, at the group level, are more integrated both
socially and through the task at hand (contracted into the
PES scheme) compared to the phase B participants.
5 | DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that both the social (phase A) and spatial
targeting (phase B) of participants was fair, and all partici-
pants were complying. We find positive outcomes through
perceived fairness and high level of compliance, which we
hypothesize is due to strong group cohesiveness and through
engaging existing social institutions. Furthermore, our
results highlight that the group level organizational structure
could be overcoming the lack of knowledge/understanding
of the PES scheme, which subsequently is ensuring that the
environmental objectives are met.
5.1 | Fairness and compliance
We find that the participants in the PES scheme, throughout
both phase A and phase B find the scheme to be overwhelm-
ingly fair and equitable across the equity dimensions. The
ATGT
Second job
ATGS
GIS
Age
Number of family members
GIT
Education
Family help on plot
FG leader
Phase B
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Parameter estimates with confidence intervals
Understand purpose of PES
Family help on plot
Second job
ATGS
GIS
Phase*Age
Number of family members
Education
Age
ATGT
GIT
FG leader
Phase B
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5
Parameter estimates with confidence intervals
Understand action of PES
Phase*Education
GIS
Second job
Family help on plot
ATGT
Number of family members
ATGS
Age
Education
GIT
FG leader
Phase B
−1 0 1 2 3
Parameter estimates with confidence intervals
Understand compliance of PES
FIGURE 4 Ordinal regression model results for if they understand the purpose, if they understand compliance and if they understand the
payments for ecosystem services action. GI-S, group integration—social; GI-T, group integration—task; ATG-S, individual attractions to the
group—social; ATG-T, individual attractions to the group—task. Phase is categorical, comparing phase B to the base level of phase A
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PES organizers decision to make the implementation more
efficient through spatial targeting appears to have minimal
negative impacts on perceptions of fairness. Some PES
schemes with government involvement, have been criticized
for emphasizing social benefits over environmental effec-
tiveness (Ezzine-de-Blas, Dutilly, Lara-Pulido, Velly, &
Guevara-Sanginés, 2016). We find that prioritizing environ-
mental effectiveness, in combination with reducing imple-
mentation costs, can be both efficient and fair. In contrast,
equity-efficiency trade-offs are often highlighted within the
PES literature (García-Amado, Pérez, Escutia, García, &
Mejía, 2011; Pascual, Muradian, Rodriguez, & Duraiappah,
2010; Wu & Yu, 2017). This is important in PES implemen-
tation as communities with strong existing social institutions
may be more conducive to establishing a PES program that
builds upon these foundations, as with phase A.
Implementers for the phase A contracted pre-existing
FGs to be participants. Whereas in phase B, the spatial prox-
imity land requirement led to FG being created and/or
amended for their participation. Due to this difference, we
anticipated disparities in group perceptions of fairness and
compliance levels, as these are influenced by group cohe-
siveness. One explanation of the similarities between phases
A and B is through high levels of social capital within these
communities (McGrath et al., 2018). High levels of social
capital can influence the success and outcomes of PES pro-
grams. Further to this, the implementers of the PES pur-
posely selected to contract at the group level, as this was in
line with the rules, norms, and culture of the communities.
Therefore through engaging participants through existing
institutions (i.e., FGs and high social capital) we found no
differences between the implementation phases as noted in
personal observations and the focus group discussions.
Importantly, research has found that more generic PES
schemes fail to recognize the culture and cohesive function
of communities (Boelens, Hoogesteger, & de Francisco,
2014) and that they must be malleable to adapt to diverse
local norms and traditions.
Further, all FGs are complying with the PES scheme
and in some cases going beyond what is required
(Table 2), meaning more trees are planted than necessary
to fulfill the PES requirement. This over exceeding may
be a reflection of the culture where trees are often used as
a guarantee if the farmers need to borrow money. It could
be that because the farmers are not allowed to cut their
trees based on the PES contract, they are planting more to
be used as a future guarantee. In addition, belonging to a
group and the strong social cohesiveness could further
explain the exceptionally high levels of compliance, and as
aforementioned the Cidanau PES site has high levels of
social capital across the community (McGrath et al.,
2018). Narloch et al. (2017) find that group level contracts
may be an incentive for compliance.
5.2 | PES understanding and information
We find that the participant understanding of the scheme is
mixed, despite finding that all farmers are complying or over
complying (Table 3). This is in line with previous research
within the Cidanau PES, Lapeyre et al. (2015) list the possible
reasons for this as low education and insufficient capacity of
FG leaders. We find that education did not act as a barrier to
the farmers understanding of the action and compliance,
rather it is important for understanding the PES purpose.
Throughout the results, we find that the group cohesiveness
explains a proportion of the farmers understanding. More spe-
cifically, results indicate that groups that have a higher group
integration over the task (GI-T) have a higher understanding
of the PES scheme's purpose, what they are supposed to do in
the PES scheme, and what happens if they do not comply.
This means that individuals who have a positive perception of
the closeness and similarity within the group about
accomplishing the task, are more likely to understand the PES
scheme. This result could also be explained by the “tanggung
renteng” or joint responsibility initiative that the local NGO
put forth during the scheme implementation. Furthermore, we
find that understanding of compliance and of the purpose of
the scheme shows no obvious correlation to the participant's
phase. We find that phase B has a better understanding of the
contractual obligations compared to phase A. This difference
in understanding may be due to phase B having to complete
the proposal more recently and the local NGO had more
intensive group facilitation with FGs in this phase.
The source of the information for the participants high-
lights an important point of power and leadership. Noted by
Lauber, Decker, and Knuth (2008), transfers of knowledge
and communication in resource management schemes usu-
ally involve a person in a position of power. In fisheries
management, it has been found that leadership is a critical
feature to promote success (Gutiérrez et al., 2011). Building
on this, leadership roles based on respect and clarity of
responsibilities can improve the likelihood of participants
understanding the project aims (Dyer et al., 2014). This
highlights the importance of ensuring that the FG leaders are
well informed and can accurately/successfully disseminate
information to their group members.
5.3 | Engaging with existing institutions—
Contracting at the group level
The majority of participants indicated they do not want more
money from the PES scheme. As aforementioned, one possi-
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ble reason for this is that the farmers were unsure if having
more money meant less for the community projects their FG
contributes to, or if it would direct from the PES organizers.
Another explanation is that the FG members do not heavily
rely on the PES payment for any other than daily household
expenses, as indicated in the focus group discussions. Within
the PES literature, there are debates about if the payments
given to participants are additional to what they would have
done without the incentive (Kerr et al., 2014). The result that
most farmers do not want more money and that the PES pay-
ment is enough to cover daily household expenses leads, to
some questions about if the scheme is truly additional. This
was explored in more detail by Lapeyre et al. (2015) who
state that the additionality of the scheme may not have been
verified and the current situation suggests that the PES orga-
nizers place their priorities on number of participants, even
in the absence of additional ecosystem service delivery.
However, beyond this, no further research has been com-
pleted and is unknown at this stage within this scheme.
We find that participants in phase B are more likely to
want an individual payment compared to those in phase A,
however, the overwhelming majority of both phases prefer a
group level contract. Narloch et al. (2017) find that working
with strong collective action provides an incentive towards
group payments rather than individual payments. As evident
in other research at Cidanau we know that the FGs and the
wider community have high levels of social capital
(McGrath et al., 2018), potentially explaining why the
farmers prefer group level contracts. Furthermore, contra-
cting the farmers in groups allows for more opportunities to
learn and discuss with each other (Narloch et al., 2017),
which may increase the successfulness of the conservation
outcomes. The Cidanau PES appears to match the conditions
for successful collective action (Agrawal, 2002) as suggested
by Kaczan, Pfaff, Rodriguez, and Shapiro-Garza (2017),
whereby the scheme is reinforcing existing governance
mechanisms through the use of FGs. Collective contracting
of PES participants can suffer from free riding which can
undermine the objectives of the scheme (Kaczan et al.,
2017). Within the Cidanau PES scheme, we hypothesize that
this may not be the case, as the farmers are faced with ran-
dom compliance monitoring. If a group member is found not
to be complying the entire group will be reprimanded and
face expulsion from the scheme. The scheme implementers
experienced this with two FGs who were subsequently
removed from the PES scheme in 2008 and 2009, respec-
tively, for non-compliance of only a few group members.
These group members were said to be the “rich men” of the
villages, who did not care about the payments. Furthermore,
Midler, Pascual, Drucker, Narloch, and Soto (2015) explore
in the Peruvian Andes that collective rewards may be more
sensitive to social factors and have the potential to be less
effective. These social factors, such as social ties and com-
munication were also identified in the Cidanau PES scheme.
Whereby high levels of social capital may have led to some
farmers to feel pressured into participating in the PES
scheme (Lapeyre et al., 2015).
The methods and results of this manuscript are not with-
out limitation. One limitation is that due to data collection
methods and low literacy rate; the enumerators read each
question and asked the respondent for their answer. This can
lead to response bias with the enumerator interpreting what
the respondent is saying, particularly with scale questions.
To overcome this we created a scale of smiley faces printed
on paper for respondents to view and select which one cor-
responded to their answer. Further, another limitation is that
the data is a snapshot of one point in time, which ignores
potential trends of perceptions over time. In addition, one
limitation is that all of the PES contracted farmers worked in
groups. Future research could investigate schemes where
groups and individuals are hired. This would allow testing
whether group social cohesion plays a role on the high com-
pliance levels observed.
6 | CONCLUSIONS
We find that both social and spatial targeting of participants
is equitable, with all FGs fulfilling their compliance target.
Furthermore, we find that the group level organizational
structure could be overcoming the lack of
knowledge/understanding of the PES scheme, which subse-
quently is ensuring that the environmental objectives are
met. We found that education is not the main variable
influencing how much the participants understand the
scheme. Instead, social factors, such as group cohesiveness,
are more important. This has implications for PES imple-
mentation. Currently, the status quo would be to explicitly
engage those with less capacity. On the other hand, in some
scenarios, the time would be better spent engaging with
those who are social outliers, who may not be those with less
capacity. This perhaps is more important when contracting
at the group level but may still have implications for contra-
cting at the individual level.
Based on the results from this research we have general
recommendations for PES practitioners. Spatial targeting
(identifying participants based on their plot location) at the
group level can be both efficient and fair if PES proponents
work within the existing institutions. Engaging in these exis-
ting institutions can ensure that the potential negative social
impacts of the PES are mediated. Further, information qual-
ity, quantity, and transparency are key. Ensuring that all par-
ticipants understand is crucial to the scheme's success. If
contracting at the group level, facilitators should make sure
that the group leaders are well educated in the scheme and its
MCGRATH ET AL. 11 of 14
details. Furthermore, group level contracts may aid in infor-
mation dissemination between group members, potentially
reducing the potential time spent by facilitators doing so.
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